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9 February 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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


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2. USSR-Vietnam: The Soviet statement on Vietnam reflects difficulties confronting Soviet leaders in their relations both with the Asian Communist governments and the US. (Page 3)



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*USSR-Vietnam: The difficulties confronting the Soviet leaders in their relations both with the Asian Communist governments and the US were reflected in yesterday's brief and generally cautious Soviet government statement.

Although it condemned the US reprisals and warned against any "illusion" that such "aggression" can be carried out with impunity, the statement did not advance the Soviet commitment beyond earlier pledges of "necessary assistance" to Hanoi. Moscow declared that it "will be forced" to join its allies in "further measures to safeguard the security and to strengthen the defensive capability" of North Vietnam. Although this statement reaffirms the USSR's readiness to provide a substantial increase in military assistance, it does not appear to signal any significant increase in the level of aid envisaged prior to Kosygin's departure for Hanoi.

Another sign of Moscow's desire to prevent any expansion of hostilities was the statement's implicit rejection of the US contention that Hanoi was directly responsible for the Pleiku attack. The statement described the attack as the work of "South Vietnamese patriots" and portrayed North Vietnam as the innocent victim of an unprovoked US attack.

The Soviets also tried to influence US policy by injecting a cautious warning that, although the USSR favors further improvement in bilateral relations, "aggressive manifestations" might cancel out steps already taken to improve them.

(continued)

Although this first authoritative Soviet reaction suggests that the Soviets will continue to avoid military guarantees or specific commitments to defend North Vietnam, it is considerably stronger than Khrushchev's reaction to the Tonkin Gulf incidents last August. This attempt to demonstrate support for North Vietnam reflects the new Soviet leaders' intention to regain influence in Hanoi and to compete more effectively with the Chinese Communists in the Indochina conflict. [REDACTED]

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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